



Benefit Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (The 
Existential Failing of Delaware) 
Brett McDonnell* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the creation and growth of benefit corpora-
tions from the perspective of strategic action field theory in an attempt to 
shed some light upon both the subject and the methodology. It considers 
how the new legal field of benefit corporations responded to weaknesses 
in the existing fields of business and nonprofit corporations. Where ma-
jor field participants such as directors, officers, employees, shareholders, 
or donors wish to pursue both financial and public-spirited goals that 
sometimes conflict without subordinating either type of goal to the other, 
both profit and nonprofit corporations may be unsatisfactory. Benefit 
corporations attempt not only to allow entrepreneurs to seek goals other 
than profits, but also to commit to doing so, thus enticing outside inves-
tors and employees to become involved. 
In explaining how the new legal form arose out of the gap created 
by these weaknesses, this Article stresses the role of B Lab as what stra-
tegic action field theory calls an internal governance unit. B Lab both 
internally regulates the field and acts as an external champion through 
creating and lobbying for model benefit corporation legislation. So far, 
benefit corporation legislation has passed in over half of the states, and 
around 2,000 companies have adopted benefit corporation status. 
This Article explores the possibility of the successful widespread 
adoption of this field by considering the role that B Lab, social networks 
and organizations, transactional lawyers, and courts could play in re-
sponding to many major identified challenges. This Article concludes 
with some reflections about what this application has taught the author 
about the strengths and weaknesses of strategic action field theory. A 
focus on the social and endogenous nature of preferences, and on a mix 
of selfishness with a search for meaning and connection as motivating 
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forces, are clearly improvements on the conceptual apparatus of the dom-
inant corporate law paradigm, law and economics. However, it remains 
to be seen whether the theory’s methodological and normative tools are 
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INTRODUCTION 
Benefit corporations are a new legal form of business association 
which has been rapidly adopted by over half of all states over the last few 
years.1 They are meant as a vehicle for entrepreneurs and investors who 
want to be involved in social enterprises, that is, businesses seeking both 
a healthy financial return for their investors while also committing to 
other socially valuable goals. Social enterprises pursue what has been 
called a triple bottom line: people, planet, and profit.2 This new legal and 
social form raises many questions. Who is attracted to this form of enter-
prise, and why? Who stands to gain from it? How does it both resemble 
and differ from other related forms of enterprise? How has it come to be 
so widely adopted by state legislatures over such a short period of time? 
What innovations in law, economic institutions, and social norms have 
occurred to make benefit corporations possible, and what further innova-
tions are needed to help them grow? What are the prospects for the eco-
nomic and social success of benefit corporations? 
In this Article, I use this new legal, economic, and social entity, as 
well as the questions it raises, as a case study for applying strategic ac-
tion field theory. Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam have recently devel-
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 2. JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY 
BUSINESS 2 (1997). 
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oped the concept of strategic action fields as a generalization of ideas 
that have appeared in a variety of different subfields of sociology, as well 
as other disciplines.3 For me, as a legal scholar with a background in 
economics, the origins and terminology of this theory are conceptually 
distant and rather forbidding. However, strategic action theory holds out 
some real promise, particularly given its understanding of preferences 
and social action, which has enough common ground with my home turf 
of rational choice and game theory to not be completely alien. The theory 
is also broad and flexible enough to permit discussion of certain econom-
ic phenomena that economic theory mostly ignores. 
Is this sociological theory comprehensible and useful for legal 
scholars trying to analyze developments in corporate law? Perhaps the 
best way to find out is to simply try. Thus, this Article applies strategic 
action field theory to analyze benefit corporations. This topic is of par-
ticular interest to me personally, as I have both already written on benefit 
corporations4 and was involved in the drafting of Minnesota’s benefit 
corporation statute.5 It also may provide an attractive case for applying 
strategic action field theory. As a formal, legal type of organization, the 
nature of the field is relatively clearly defined, and there are other 
well-known related fields to which one can compare it to—namely, ordi-
nary for-profit and nonprofit corporations. Social enterprises, by defini-
tion, focus on a mix of more instrumental, self-centered goals, as well as 
more other-oriented values, which also occur within the sociological the-
ory. So, we shall see what we can learn about both strategic action fields 
and benefit corporations by applying the theory of the former to the story 
of the latter. Of course, as someone not at all trained in sociology, the 
exercise may merely reveal my lack of understanding, but since that lack 
is itself presumably quite common among corporate law scholars, per-
haps my failings may themselves prove instructive. 
This Article starts by briefly describing the theory of strategic ac-
tion fields.6 It then analyzes the forces that have led to the creation of 
benefit corporations as a new form of business association, using strate-
gic action field theory (as I understand it) in telling the story.7 The Arti-
                                                     
 3. NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUGLAS MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS 8 (2012) [hereinafter 
FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, THEORY]; see also Neil Fligstein & Douglas McAdam, Toward a General 
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cle concludes with some reflections about what I have learned about the 
uses and the limits of the strategic action field concept through the pro-
cess of going through this exercise.8 
I. THE THEORY OF STRATEGIC ACTION FIELDS 
Although I am a corporate law scholar with a background in eco-
nomics, I like to think that I am relatively broad-minded for someone in 
that position. Thus, the idea of drawing upon sociological theory is not 
inherently dubious from my perspective. Indeed, there are some real at-
tractions to that theory. The embeddedness of humans in social structures 
is a central part of social life and action that economics does not capture 
well outside of a few isolated elements. In particular, the social nature of 
individual preferences and norms, and the ways in which they help shape 
and are shaped by individual actions within society, is a crucial topic that 
economics does not adequately address. I have tried to use economic 
theory to think formally about preferences as endogenous,9 but despite 
some efforts by significant economists,10 that theory is not well adapted 
to such ideas. In several papers with Claire Hill, I have informally con-
sidered how Delaware judges help shape corporate governance norms.11 
In one paper, I have tried to think about deeper norms that shape, and are 
shaped by, the core structure of corporations and corporate law, and in 
particular the lack of a role for employees in governing corporations.12 
Yet, I am still very much in the hunt for a theoretical perspective that is 
better suited for exploring such ideas than law and economics. 
I am also interested in the structural similarities between strategic 
action fields and some of the elements of modern economic theory. A 
field, as Fligstein and McAdam use the term, is similar to the idea of a 
game in game theory. In both, actors try to achieve a preferred outcome 
                                                     
 8. See infra pp. 287–90. 
 9. See Brett H. McDonnell, Endogenous Preferences and Welfare Evaluations (Minn. Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 06-50, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=933089. 
 10. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: 
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75 (1998); Herbert Gintis, Welfare Criteria with Endogenous Preferences: The Economics of Educa-
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Change of Tastes, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 345 (1971). 
 11. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. 
L. 833, 862–63 (2007); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Op-
timal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 349–57 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Hill & McDonnell, Optimal Penumbra]. 
 12. See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at 
Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008). 
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while taking into account the interrelationship between their actions and 
those of others, with their actions grounded in underlying rules of the 
game that define the outcomes and payoffs from the collective choices of 
all actors within the field/game. Field theory adds complexity by stress-
ing that the rules of the field itself change as a result of prior actions by 
the actors in the field. This element is missing from ordinary game theo-
ry, but it is very much present in the version of game theory that 
Masahiko Aoki developed in his theory of comparative institutional 
analysis.13 Field theory, with its stress on the macro-environment and the 
role of the state in helping to shape fields, also resembles public choice 
theory in some ways, although the motivations of both state and nonstate 
actors are broader in field theory than in public choice. 
In my initial explorations of field theory, I have also encountered 
elements that make me skeptical. One of these is simple (actually, not so 
simple) terminology. Field theory entails a lot of jargon that is not easy 
for a novitiate to understand; the theory was mostly designed for sociol-
ogists, and although Fligstein and McAdam do make some effort to draw 
in the uninitiated, it is far from easy. Moreover, a lot of the technical 
terms seem pretty vague and open-ended. Fligstein and McAdam them-
selves admit this is an issue—for instance, the core question of what con-
stitutes a field is far from clear. In their list of seven fundamental ques-
tions that field theory must answer, the first is “How are we to under-
stand field boundaries and the ways in which they change?”14 This ques-
tion calls attention not only to how one tells whether a field exists, but 
also to the further complication as to who are the players in that field. 
Fields can be quite local and specific, or quite global, large, and vague, 
illustrating the vagueness of the core term “field.” 
The heavy emphasis on power and on the distinction between in-
cumbents and challengers within a field is another challenging character-
istic for economists. Although Fligstein and McAdam grant that some 
fields can be cooperative rather than hierarchical, their preferred mode 
by far seems to see fields as struggles, where some are on top and some 
are subordinate. Economics probably underestimates the role of power 
and struggle, but as I shall discuss further below,15 my sense is that the 
sociological literature errs in the other direction. 
                                                     
 13. See generally MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
(2001). It would be very interesting to analyze in some depth the parallel between Aoki’s theory and 
that of Fligstein and McAdam. 
 14. FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, THEORY, supra note 3, at 215. 
 15. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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And so, in this Article, I present reasons to be attracted to field the-
ory and reasons to be wary of it. To try to sort out those mixed reactions, 
using the theory to analyze the rise of benefit corporation statutes may 
help. Before turning to that story, let me briefly summarize some of the 
major elements of strategic action fields—for those unfamiliar with the 
concept as developed by Fligstein and McAdam. 
First, Fligstein and McAdam define strategic action field as “a 
meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or collec-
tive) interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common un-
derstandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field 
(including who has power and why), and the field’s rules.”16 Although 
that “meso-level” term is an example of the kind of taken-for-granted 
sociological terminology that pervades paper and book (I Googled it, and 
meso-level refers to the levels between micro and macro), replacing 
“field” with “game” brings the term close to the definition used in game 
theory; although, game theory speaks of preferences and outcomes rather 
than the purposes of the game, and economists would eschew that paren-
thetical about power. Strategic action field theory puts a greater emphasis 
on the “set of common understandings about the purposes of the field” 
and on how those understandings change, both deliberately and 
nondeliberately, through interactions over time. 
Fligstein and McAdam see those interactions as involving a con-
stant process of at least low-level contention between “incumbents” and 
“challengers,” with the former being “those actors who wield dispropor-
tionate influence within a field and whose interests and views tend to be 
heavily reflected in the dominant organization of the [strategic action 
field].”17 Individual incumbents and challengers have varying degrees of 
“social skill,” which plays a major role in the theory. Actors with a high 
level of social skill are good at using their position within the field, and 
their relationships with other actors in it, to help shape matters to their 
advantage. High social skill requires the ability to read persons and situa-
tions well, and to use one’s insight and resources to strategically mobi-
lize persons to advance both one’s personal position and one’s broader 
values, as understood within the purposes of the field.18 
An understanding of human goals and values is closely related to 
the notion of social skill. Fligstein and McAdam state: 
[O]ur preferences themselves are generally rooted in the central 
sources of meaning and identi[t]y in our lives. . . . [F]or us collec-
                                                     
 16. Fligstein & McAdam, General Theory, supra note 3, at 3. 
 17. Id. at 5. 
 18. FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, THEORY, supra note 3, at 17. 
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tive strategic action is rooted at least as much in Weber’s stress on 
meaning making and Mead’s focus on empathy as on the naked in-
strumental orientation of Marx.19 
This is a far cry from homo economicus (though, I suspect, most econo-
mists would not be pleased at being lumped with Marx). 
This leads to Fligstein and McAdam’s concept of the “existential 
function of the social.” Our human ability to step outside ourselves can 
be profoundly disturbing, and we look to our social interactions with oth-
ers to provide us with meaning and reassurance that we matter. 
Our daily lives are typically grounded in the unshakable conviction 
that no one’s life is more important than our own and that the world 
is an inherently meaningful place. But one does not will this inner 
view into existence of his or her own accord. It is instead a collabo-
rative product, both of the everyday reciprocal meaning making, 
identity conferring efforts we engage in with those around us. In 
this we function as existential “coconspirators,” relentlessly—if 
generally unconsciously—exchanging affirmations that sustain our 
sense of our own significance and the world’s inherent meaningful-
ness.20 
Throughout, Fligstein and McAdam blend instrumental goals (particular-
ly increasing one’s personal power over others) with goals defined by 
collective purposes and understandings. 
Fligstein and McAdam also stress that fields should not be studied 
in isolation by focusing only on internal relations between actors within a 
field. Rather, fields are situated in a broader environment which they 
help shape and, which, more importantly, does much to shape them, and 
to trigger changes within fields. At the macro-level, Fligstein and 
McAdam discuss various ways in which fields can interact,21 with partic-
ular attention on two kinds of actors that play a major role at the mac-
ro-level. One is the state and various state institutions—courts, legisla-
tures, agencies, etc.—which are fields themselves and thus subject to 
analysis under the theory. The state is particularly important because it 
regulates the creation and expansion of new fields, most obviously so 
with fields that have a formal legal basis, such as business associations.22 
The second kind of important actor at a macro-level is internal gov-
ernance units. These are “organizations or associations within the field 
whose sole job is to ensure the routine stability and order of the strategic 
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action field.”23 These fill both an external function, by lobbying state 
actors on behalf of incumbents within the field, as well as an internal 
function, such as providing information to actors within the field, regu-
lating to ensure conformance with field rules, and certifying field mem-
bership.24 
Using these elements, Fligstein and McAdam attempt to create a 
dynamic theory that helps explain the creation, maintenance, and occa-
sional crises, followed by death or reconstruction, for various fields. 
Their book illustrates the range of topics they intend to cover by two ex-
tended illustrative applications of the theory, one analyzing U.S. race 
relations from 1932 to 1980, and the other analyzing the rise and fall of 
mortgage securitization from 1969 to 2011.25 Thus, analysis of the rise of 
benefit corporations falls well within the ambitious range of strategic 
action field theory. 
II. PRE-EXISTING FIELDS: FOR-PROFIT AND NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 
Benefit corporations are situated in between, and are a response to, 
two other legally-defined fields that have been around much longer and 
play a much larger role in the economy and society: for-profit business 
corporations and nonprofit corporations.26 Benefit corporations are a re-
action to perceived limitations in each, and they combine elements of 
both, although they are more closely related to the former. To understand 
both the legal properties of benefit corporations and their social origins, 
one must first look to these forms. 
Business corporations are the leading legal form of business in the 
United States in terms of numbers employed and sales revenue generat-
ed. Most large businesses are corporations, as are many small ones (alt-
hough limited liability companies now outstrip corporations in terms of 
number of new businesses started every year). In every state, corporate 
laws legally define businesses. For our purposes, it is useful to think of 
corporations in terms of several key constituent groups: 
• Shareholders, widely thought of as the owners of corpora-
tions, contribute equity capital (or have purchased those 
                                                     
 23. Id. at 77. 
 24. Id. at 78. 
 25. Id. at 114–61. 
 26. Is it accurate within the theory to label an abstract legal organizational form a field? Indi-
vidual benefit corporations are certainly fields, but are benefit corporations collectively also a field? 
The term is quite protean and vague, but given the enormous breadth of the two fields analyzed at 
greatest depth in Fligstein and McAdam’s book—namely U.S. race relations and the mortgage secu-
ritization industry—it would certainly seem that benefit corporations count as well. Indeed, they 
would seem to be a rather more precisely defined field than those in the book. 
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shares from those who did, if one tracks ownership far 
enough back). In return they receive limited voting rights, 
dividends (if the corporation chooses to pay), and the abil-
ity to sell their shares and realize capital gain. Shareholders 
elect the directors. 
• Directors, elected by shareholders, sit on the board of di-
rectors. The board of directors, as a collective body, has 
general authority, except for the very limited decisions on 
which the shareholders get a vote. In larger businesses, the 
board delegates most decision to the officers, who the 
board appoints and supervises. 
• Officers are responsible for making major decisions, and 
for hiring and monitoring others who work for the business 
(corporations are hierarchical organizations). 
• Employees fall below officers in the hierarchy and do most 
of the daily work of the business. 
All of these groups fall within the strategic action field of a corporation. 
Also highly relevant to the field, but less clearly a part of the field,27 are 
customers who buy the corporation’s goods or services, and creditors 
who provide debt capital in return for interest payments (and ultimately a 
return of their principal). 
Fligstein and McAdam distinguish hierarchical and cooperative 
fields. Which are corporations? As previously noted, corporations are at 
least in part hierarchical. A defining feature of the hierarchical nature of 
corporations is that employees must follow the directions of their super-
visors, within the limits of their employment contracts. Thus, the direc-
tors and officers are incumbents and employees are challengers. Indeed, 
the informational efficiency of such hierarchy in some circumstances is a 
core reason for the economic success of corporations.28 
But what of the relationship between shareholders and directors? 
This relationship is not clearly hierarchical, and depends in part upon the 
type of corporation. While shareholders have the authority to elect and 
remove directors, in a large public corporation with thousands of share-
holders and tradable shares, their authority often has limited practical 
effect—boards of large corporations are mostly self-perpetuating.29 
Shareholders who also serve as employees or officers are subject to the 
                                                     
 27. FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, THEORY, supra note 3, at 167. 
 28. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 54–55 (1974). 
 29. This problem was first brought into focus in ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE 
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board’s authority for internal corporate matters. External shareholders 
look to the board to return profits and have very little power to control 
the directors if they are unhappy with their performance. The sharehold-
er–director relationship thus often looks more cooperative than hierar-
chical. The same could be said for relationships between creditors or cus-
tomers and whomever they deal with at the corporation. 
Why do the various constituent groups participate in a corporate 
field? Most of these actors receive financial gains from their participa-
tion. Shareholders receive dividends, capital gains, or both. Employees 
receive wages. Directors and officers receive salaries and, typically, eq-
uity-based compensation such as shares or stock options. Some employ-
ees, especially higher level ones, may be similarly compensated. Credi-
tors receive interest. 
But many actors within a corporation may care about more than just 
financial returns. This is particularly true for individuals, at least officers 
and employees, whose role within a corporation is also their job; the time 
they spend working for the corporation encompasses a large part of their 
lives. Their compensation will usually be their main source of income, 
but their position will also be a leading source of social prestige and in-
fluence (or lack thereof). Many of their friendships may be formed with-
in the corporation. If they are lucky, what they do in their work may be 
interesting and a major source of satisfaction and accomplishment. What 
they do in their work also can affect others—fellow employees, custom-
ers, others in society, the surrounding environment, and so on—and they 
may feel satisfaction and pride if they think what they do at work is help-
ing others, and the opposite if it is hurting others.30 All of this very much 
matters—not just the financial returns, though those matter too. Econo-
mists tend to miss this aspect, while Fligstein and McAdam stress it 
through “the existential function of the social.”31 
While corporations necessarily provide major financial and nonfi-
nancial benefits to those who participate in them, many perceive a dis-
turbing trend in many corporations, especially the large ones that domi-
nate economic life. An increasing stress has been placed on financial re-
turns at the expense of the nonfinancial aspects of corporate life, which 
play a major role in the employees’ personal and social meaning. Em-
ployees in particular often feel disrespected, as if they are disposable 
cogs, as long-term tenure of employment has become less common and 
loyalty between corporations and employees has diminished. Officers 
and directors feel increasing pressure to produce high profits to keep the 
                                                     
 30. See McDonnell, supra note 12, at 361–62 and scholarship cited therein. 
 31. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
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stock market satisfied, making their working life more stressful and con-
strained, and also limiting their ability to do what seems morally right 
and socially valuable if that interferes with making money.32 This market 
pressure is meant to be for the good of shareholders, but some sharehold-
ers wish that the businesses in which they invested were more interested 
in doing some social good, not just making money.33 Customers, most of 
the time, care mainly about the quality and price of the services or goods 
they buy. And yet, some may reconsider their spending habits when they 
become aware of some dubious corporate activity of a business from 
which they buy (child labor, extreme pollution, political corruption, and 
so on).34 
Corporate law has both reflected and helped encourage an increased 
focus on making profits to the exclusion of other social goals. Whether 
or not the fiduciary duty of directors and officers allows them to consider 
other interests, where those conflict with profit maximization is a source 
of endless scholarly diversion.35 At least in states with corporate constit-
uency statutes, it would seem that directors and officers may consider 
other goals as well.36 However, the meaning of those statutes remains 
legally untested, and the idea of a duty to maximize profit has, if any-
thing, gained increasing dominance in recent decades. Especially in the 
leading state of incorporation, Delaware, which lacks a constituency 
statute, there has been an increasing tendency to use rhetoric of share-
holder primacy, although the law still retains some ambiguity.37 Howev-
er, a small yet influential run of cases has moved the focus of duty to-
wards an emphasis on return to shareholders.38 The Chief Justice of the 
                                                     
 32. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short and Long Term Investors (and Other 
Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 
forthcoming) (discussing corporate short-termism and its relationship with social values). 
 33. For an overview, see Meir Statman, Socially Responsible Investments (June 2007) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=995271. 
 34. Lois A. Mohr, Deborah J. Webb & Katherine E. Harris, Do Consumers Expect Companies 
to Be Socially Responsible? The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Buying Behavior, 35 
J. CONSUMER AFF. 45, 64–65 (2001). 
 35. For a book-length discussion that opposes the notion that corporations must and should 
concentrate only on shareholder value, see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW 
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012). 
 36. Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2004). 
 37. Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
1385, 1405–07 (2008). 
 38. See e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33–34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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Delaware Supreme Court has, in several recent articles, made it quite 
clear that this is his understanding of the law.39 
Here, we start to see the existential failing of Delaware. The focus 
on shareholder value as a goal helps accentuate the sense that corpora-
tions are just about making money, ethics and the public good be 
damned. People need money, but they also want to lead meaningful lives 
and retain some sense of integrity while earning that money, if at all pos-
sible. And yet, corporate life, as defined by contemporary market and 
legal institutions, hardly seems noble. 
Ironically, the shareholder value focus of corporate law does have a 
serious ethical foundation. This value serves as a way to harden the fidu-
ciary duty of directors and officers. They are using shareholder money 
and are morally obliged not to use that money for their own personal 
benefit. Defining this fiduciary duty in terms of maximizing share price 
is often justified as providing a hard measure so that it is more difficult 
for directors and officers to justify self-serving behavior in reference to a 
vague corporate objective. But that is not the way that many perceive the 
shareholder value standard, particularly in a world where Wall Street is 
perceived to have become detached from any sense of personal and so-
cial responsibility.40 The shareholder value maximization norm is also 
often justified as a way of maximizing overall social welfare, but it is 
quite unclear if that is correct.41 
These issues play out rather differently in public versus closely held 
corporations. Public corporations, which are larger due to their           
publicly-traded shares, typically have thousands of shareholders, none of 
whom control the business. Most shareholders have no personal ties to 
the business, and institutional investors own a majority of the shares. Ra-
ther, control lies with the board, which nowadays is composed mostly of 
outside directors. More specifically, real control of the business lies 
mostly with the officers, predominately the CEO. Stock market pressure 
for high share prices is a major reality for officers of such corporations.42 
                                                     
 39. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 145–46 (2012) (“[M]y point is that managers in stock-
holder-financed corporations are inevitably answerable to the stockholders, whatever the ‘communi-
ty values’ articulated by the corporation’s founders or others . . . .”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It 
Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 235 (2014) (“[I]n the 
current corporate accountability structure, stockholders are the only constituency given any enforce-
able rights, and thus are the only one with substantial influence over managers.”). 
 40. Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Invest-
ment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Responsibility, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1178 
(2010). 
 41. McDonnell, supra note 12, at 357–63. 
 42. Hill & McDonnell, Short and Long Term Investors, supra note 32. 
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As a result of the systemic forces involved in the corporate structure, 
employees find themselves a part of a large, often impersonal bureaucra-
cy. 
By contrast, there are fewer shareholders in closely held corpora-
tions, with one person or family generally controlling the business. Those 
shareholders are often also directors and officers. There may or may not 
be minority shareholders, but there is no stock market pressure, and the 
relationship with minority shareholders (if any) is quite different, and 
more personal, than in public corporations. In small, closely held corpo-
rations, the relationships between employees and officers are often less 
bureaucratic. Here, the pressures for share price maximization are less 
pronounced. However, especially where there are significant outside 
shareholder-investors, some pressure remains, and the legal norms of 
public corporations may filter down to all corporations. 
The other main relevant field that has influenced benefit corpora-
tions is the nonprofit corporation. These are corporations also defined by 
state law. Nonprofits also have directors, officers, and employees, but 
they do not have shareholders, because the defining difference from 
business corporations is that there are no shareholders with a claim to 
profits.43 However, this is not to say that there are no profits. Nonprofit 
corporations have revenues, which in some cases come from the sale of 
goods and services. Employees, officers, and directors also receive wag-
es. Beneficiaries of charitable nonprofits may receive donations from the 
nonprofits. Nonprofits may also have donors who contribute money but 
receive no financial returns from their contributions. 
Some of the formal control mechanisms in nonprofit corporations 
remain similar to business corporations; boards appoint and supervise 
officers, who in turn employ and supervise employees. But the boards of 
nonprofits are legally self-perpetuating, with no shareholders to elect 
them. Their relationship with donors is more explicitly legal-
ly-cooperative than the shareholder-director relationship, since donors 
have no formal authority over directors at all. Still, the success of many 
nonprofits depends upon attracting money from donors. 
There is still a mix of pecuniary and nonpecuniary motivations, but 
the mix is quite different from business corporations. The wages of some 
officers and employees at nonprofit corporations can be quite large. 
However, officers and employees will generally earn less than they could 
at a for-profit business. They are willing to work for less money because 
they derive more satisfactory social meanings from working for a      
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nonprofit focused on achieving specified social goods. The previous sen-
tence is easier for a sociologist to process than for an economist.44 
The limitations of nonprofits are the mirror image of the concerns 
surrounding for-profit business corporations. Although officers and em-
ployees are paid, the pay is often low enough that it tests the moral 
commitments of even the hardiest moralists. More importantly for our 
purposes, although Americans are generous donors to charities, people 
with money to invest are typically not willing to give all of it away—
they want to earn some financial returns on at least some of their capital. 
Donors to nonprofits receive no financial returns, thereby shutting off 
huge potential sources of capital to such corporations. 
Is it possible to combine the nonpecuniary attractions of nonprofits 
with greater financial returns, approaching if not necessarily equaling 
those of for-profits? Many think (or at least hope) that the answer is yes, 
leading to the rise of social enterprises. 
III. THE RISE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISES AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 
Social enterprises are located in the gap between for-profits and 
nonprofits. They pursue a triple bottom line of profits, people, and plan-
ets.45 That is, they seek financial returns for investors, but financial goals 
are not meant to overwhelm other important social goals of the business. 
Social enterprises are typically dedicated to one or a few specific social 
goals, and have an overarching goal to help, or at least not harm, the var-
ious groups and interests affected by their business. Several new legal 
forms, most importantly the benefit corporation, have sprung up to at-
tempt to address the special needs of social enterprises. To better under-
stand those needs it is important to consider the goals of the actors and 
how they might approach the possibility of participating in a social en-
terprise. What are their hopes and fears? 
Consider first an entrepreneur or small group of entrepreneurs who 
have an idea for an enterprise that they would like to set up and run. 
They will be the officers and at least some of the directors of the new 
business (assuming a corporate form of some type).46 They think their 
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idea has the potential to generate significant financial returns. They want 
to share in those returns, and although in a nonprofit they could do so 
with their salaries, that does not give them as strong of a stake in the pos-
sible long-run high profits that share ownership provides. Alternatively, 
they could become a corporation; however, they would likely be con-
cerned about the possible pressure to maximize profits, which could 
force them to take actions that would ultimately violate their social 
commitments. That is particularly true insofar as they anticipate bringing 
in a number of outside shareholder-investors over time as a way of rais-
ing money. The entrepreneurs want their business to remain committed 
to their social goals for the long term, and they also want to convince 
outside investors, employees, and customers who care about such things 
that their commitment is serious and not mere greenwashing (i.e., mouth-
ing social or environmental goals with no real commitment to following 
them, as a way of inducing others to participate).47 Many such businesses 
will indeed need early investments from outside sources of capital, and 
the entrepreneurs must consider how to attract such investment. 
Consider next potential investors. There are a variety of possibili-
ties. Some investors may simply be looking for a good financial return. 
An enterprise committed to social goals as well as profits may concern 
the investors because they fear that, in some circumstances, the business 
may make decisions that lower profits in order to pursue their social val-
ues. Other investors may not care to receive any financial return and 
simply want to give money to enterprises that are doing good in the 
world. They will be wary of investing in social enterprises for the oppo-
site reason, fearing instead that the business will sometimes pursue prof-
its at the expense of its social goals, and also because investing in a so-
cial enterprise will be less tax-advantaged than investing in a nonprofit. 
However, some potential investors may fall in between those two 
possibilities. They do want to earn some financial returns, but they also 
want to accomplish some social good with their money. They are attract-
ed by the business plan of our group of entrepreneurs because they find 
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its social goal(s) attractive. Such investors are more willing to wait long-
er to achieve financial returns, take a larger risk of no returns, or receive 
somewhat lower returns than purely money-motivated investors. None-
theless, these investors will similarly be concerned about whether the 
business will actually work out as advertised. 
In addition to the common concerns of outside investors (Are the 
entrepreneurs competent? Are they honest, or will they use the money to 
advantage themselves at the expense of the business if given a chance?), 
the investors may also wonder whether the social commitment of the en-
trepreneurs is genuine or cheap talk used to attract capital at lower cost. 
And even if the commitment is genuine, there can be hard 
decisionmaking questions when there are conflicts between competing 
goals (Can the outside investors trust the insiders to make the decisions 
they would prefer, even assuming good faith?). All sorts of hard deci-
sions may arise over time (How can the entrepreneurs and investors enter 
into a relationship where the latter trust the former to make those deci-
sions in ways that acceptably balance competing values?). 
Entrepreneurs and potential investors are the two core groups of in-
cumbents in the founding and early years of a social enterprise. Their 
relationship seems more cooperative than hierarchical, although the exact 
nature of that relationship will depend upon the control structure of the 
enterprise, which will arise from the interaction of the default rules of the 
legal form of association they choose, combined with the particularized 
structural rules they adopt in their organizational documents. But as not-
ed in the previous Part,48 they will also need to think about how other 
actors will react to the organizational form they choose. 
Employees, the leading challengers within a corporation, will care 
about both their own place within the business and about the goals of that 
business. As to their own place, employees would often prefer to have 
some degree of control over decisions that affect them. Failing that, they 
would at least like some commitment from the business that it will take 
their interests into account. The corporate form is not a good fit for 
providing employees a role in decisionmaking, although the form can be 
particularized to provide a role for some or all employees.49 Insofar as 
the for-profit form pushes directors and officers to focus on shareholder 
wealth maximization as the exclusive or leading goal, employees may 
distrust the decisionmaking of their superiors. Some degree of commit-
ment to considering employees in decisionmaking may make potential 
employees more willing to work for a business or to work for it at a low-
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er wage level. Also, potential employees, like entrepreneurs and potential 
investors, may want to be involved in businesses they think are doing 
good in the world. Thus, while a social enterprise may attract employees 
for multiple reasons, employees—like outside investors—may worry 
about the possibility of greenwashing. 
Customers may or may not be actors situated within the corporate 
field, but either way, entrepreneurs must care deeply about attracting 
them; no customers means no revenue and ultimately no business. Some 
customers may prefer to buy from businesses that they believe behave 
ethically in how they treat workers, the environment, and so on.50 Thus, 
being perceived as ethical may help businesses attract more customers, 
who may be willing to pay higher prices. But here too there is a 
greenwashing concern: would-be customers may fear that a business that 
proclaims its ethical commitments is engaging in cheap talk. After all, 
customers are generally not well-placed to examine the actual practices 
of most businesses. For this reason, to attract customers with ethical 
commitments, the entrepreneurs will need to find ways to credibly com-
mit to behaving ethically. 
With all of these concerns of various groups, a space has opened up 
for actors to innovate and create new fields in which entrepreneurs can 
find ways to establish and run a business that allows them to pursue both 
profit and social values, and to attract credible investors, employees, and 
customers interested in participating in such a business. A variety of in-
novative new practices have been tried, including having a third-party 
organization certify that a particular business was behaving in specified 
ethical ways. In the next Part, I discuss the most important of these for 
our purposes: B Lab.51 Eventually, one began to see new legal forms of 
business associations emerge. Perhaps the first form to emerge was the 
low-profit limited liability corporation, or L3C. The L3C was developed 
to help provide vehicles for investments in program-related investments 
by charitable organizations. It has been heavily criticized for not ful-
filling this purpose.52 After an initial spurt of interest, it now seems that 
perhaps L3Cs are giving way to another new form: the benefit corpora-
tion. 
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State statutes legally define benefit corporations. These statutes sit 
atop the basic business corporation statute. That is, benefit corporations 
are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business cor-
poration statute, except insofar as the benefit corporation statute provides 
different or additional rules. The statutes add just a few new rules. Bene-
fit corporations must state what they are in their certificate or articles of 
incorporation and certify their purpose of pursuing “general public bene-
fit.” General public benefit is very broadly defined to include, in the most 
influential version of the statutes, “a material positive impact on society 
and the environment, taken as a whole.”53 A benefit corporation may also 
specify in its charter a “specific public benefit” it will choose to pursue.54 
They must file regular reports (annual in most statutes) that detail what 
they have done to pursue general public benefit and any specific public 
benefit they may have chosen.55 The directors and officers have a fiduci-
ary duty to consider the general and (if any) specific public benefit,56 and 
shareholders may sue if they believe that duty has been violated.57 Thus, 
not only are benefit corporations allowed to pursue social goals other 
than profit maximization (which is questionable in Delaware and still has 
a hint of a question mark even in states with constituency statutes), they 
are required to do so (which is not true even in states with constituency 
statutes). This requirement is backed by a right to sue if a corporation 
ignores its social goals, and by a forced disclosure rule that allows inves-
tors and others to observe and evaluate a business’ claims about how it is 
helping society.58 
I focus on benefit corporations, but it is worth noting a close vari-
ant: social or flexible purpose corporations.59 Unlike benefit corpora-
tions, social or flexible purpose corporations do not have the broad gen-
eral public benefit purpose backed by a duty. Rather, a social purpose 
corporation must specify one or more specific goals, and it is then bound 
by a legal duty to pursue (or at least consider) that goal(s). Thus, social 
or flexible purpose corporations are not required to pursue general public 
benefits beyond their stated specific goal(s). Minnesota’s benefit corpo-
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ration statute includes both options, with “general benefit corporations” 
committed to the broad general public benefit and “specific benefit cor-
porations” committed only to a more focused, individualized goal.60 The 
more specifically focused businesses avoid the extremely wide scope of 
the general public benefit definition, which requires a business to take 
into account every material effect that each decision it makes has on an-
yone—a somewhat daunting prospect.61 On the other hand, outsiders 
cannot necessarily trust a specific benefit corporation to behave more 
ethically than any other business outside of its specified social goal. 
IV. PASSAGE OF STATUTES AND PROSPECTS 
As of March 16, 2015, thirty-three states had enacted a version of 
benefit corporation legislation.62 Since Maryland became the first state to 
enact such legislation in April 2010,63 this is quite a rapid adoption rate. 
This is particularly striking because, according to one study, as of July 
2014, there were 998 benefit corporations in the United States.64 That is 
not bad for a form that has been around for just half a decade, but it is not 
a large number. How have so many states gotten on the bandwagon so 
quickly given the relatively limited number of businesses taking up the 
form so far? 
Two important elements in field theory come into play here. One is 
the idea of an internal governance unit (IGU).65 As noted above,66 IGUs 
act as internal regulators of a field by, among other things, certifying 
membership. IGUs also serve as external champions, above all, by push-
ing the state for helpful legal reforms. The benefit corporation has an 
IGU that does both: B Lab. B Lab was founded in 200667 by entrepre-
neurs who had formerly founded a basketball shoe company.68 B Lab 
certifies businesses as sustainable, using a variety of metrics to measure 
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social and environmental performance, accountability, and transparen-
cy.69 It also provides analytic tools for companies, investors, and others 
who want to analyze the social performance of a business.70 Thus, B Lab 
addresses a critical problem that socially conscious entrepreneurs face: 
how to credibly convey that they are truly pursuing social goals, not 
merely mouthing nice-sounding platitudes (at least, assuming one trusts 
the B Lab analytics and certification process—an in-depth analysis 
should not automatically trust this). Here, we see an explicit and formal 
version of the internal, certification feature of an IGU. 
B Lab also drafted the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation that 
has become the basis for most, though not all, state statutes.71 That takes 
us to the external role of an IGU, which acts as a lobbyist with the state. 
The record of state adoptions mentioned above suggests that B Lab has 
been quite successful. The Model Legislation presents legislators with a 
relatively short and straightforward statute ready to be adopted, which 
considerably simplifies the task. By making the benefit corporation an 
add-on to the basic business corporation, B Lab avoided having to rein-
vent the wheel. Corporate law is quite complex, and trying to write rules 
for all elements of business association law is a daunting task, likely to 
raise questions at many points. 
But how have so many states adopted legislation so quickly, given 
the relatively small number of businesses that have adopted benefit cor-
poration or B Lab certification status,72 particularly within our current 
polarized political climate, where most significant legislation is extreme-
ly hard to enact? A standard public choice interest group model73 may 
provide the answer, suggesting that there is at least one organization 
strongly pushing for benefit corporation legislation (B Lab itself), and in 
each state presumably a few businesses or interested would-be entrepre-
neurs who support the legislation. Meanwhile, there is little to no orga-
nized opposition to this type of legislation. Existing business corpora-
tions are not harmed by the added legislation—no one is forced to be-
come a benefit corporation. Plenty of people are possibly skeptical about 
the value of or need for benefit corporation status, but those skeptics can 
simply ignore the form and predict that few businesses will adopt it. 
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The one significant source of opposition of which I am aware is 
some state bar associations.74 Transactional lawyers are skeptical of ben-
efit corporations—they do not think they are needed to allow businesses 
to pursue social goals—at least in states with constituency statutes. They 
also fear the costs of annual reporting and the risk of duty suits that could 
make benefit corporation status become a trap for well-meaning entre-
preneurs. In my own state, Minnesota, proposed legislation was blocked 
for several years until the state bar decided that the bandwagon was mak-
ing the legislation inevitable. 
But the public choice explanation only goes so far. Yes, there may 
be little organized opposition (besides the bar), but the organized support 
is quite limited. Legislating is hard, even with little opposition, so why 
has it been so successful with such modest support? The availability of 
model legislation based on existing corporate law statutes, which reduces 
the costs of drafting, is a part of the answer. However, I think another 
answer lies with the ideology of our two parties. B Lab and other pro-
moters of benefit corporations may have shown much social skill in find-
ing this sweet spot that appeals to both parties.75 Benefit corporations 
appeal to Democrats because many of them are skeptical of for-profit 
corporations, and they like social responsibility and sustainability. Bene-
fit corporations are a way to advance those worthy goals. On the other 
hand, Republicans would be very unhappy about forcing social responsi-
bility on businesses. However, remember that no business is forced to 
become a benefit corporation. The new form simply makes a new option 
available. We will then let the marketplace decide whether there is any 
significant demand for such businesses or not. Benefit corporations can 
thus be promoted as a free market solution to perceived social problems. 
Republicans like free markets. And thus, each party can see benefit cor-
poration legislation as fitting quite nicely with a core ideological com-
mitment. 
So, benefit corporation legislation is spreading rapidly and one can 
easily foresee a day not far away where all states have adopted such leg-
islation. As Fligstein and McAdam note, state action to legitimate and 
facilitate a new field is quite significant.76 But, state action alone is not 
enough to guarantee the success of a new form of business (at least not 
state action of the enabling kind we see here—I suppose if all businesses 
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were forced to abide by the duty rules of benefit corporations, the story 
would be different). Although we are observing some businesses adopt-
ing the new legal status, the numbers are still quite modest. What are the 
prospects for widespread creation of benefit corporations, and what 
source of actions and innovations by actors inside (or outside) the field 
might help spread the form more widely? 
We have seen why benefit corporation status may be attractive to 
socially motivated entrepreneurs: it clearly allows them to pursue goals 
other than profit while still earning financial returns, and may prove a 
useful commitment device to attract investors, employees, and customers 
who want to be involved in a socially beneficial business but fear 
greenwashing. The reporting requirement and especially the new fiduci-
ary duty act as precommitment devices. If a business says it is dedicated 
to pursing social good but fails to do so, it can be sued, providing signifi-
cant incentive to not make such a claim unless one means it.77 But there 
is a cost attached to this: a fear of suits even where the directors and of-
ficers are acting in good faith. The law can reduce that fear through vari-
ous mechanisms that limit liability. Benefit corporation statutes do this 
by imposing limitations on personal liability, incorporating the business 
judgment rule, and limiting standing to sue (only shareholders can sue to 
enforce the duty).78 
But such limitations on suits in turn have a cost. Remember, the 
point of the duty and threat of suits is to provide a credible commitment 
device. If the law imposes too many limitations on suits, the commitment 
may fail to be credible. Investors, employees, and customers may look to 
benefit corporation status as proof that a business is not merely engaged 
in greenwashing. But, if the space starts being occupied by businesses 
with little real commitment to social goals, and they face no consequenc-
es for such deception, then benefit corporation status will have failed to 
do its job.79 
Note that in this analysis, our actors blend idealism with a hard-
headed pursuit of their own interests. Entrepreneurs and investors each 
want to improve the world, but they want to make money and want to 
retain as much control as possible over the business as well. The new 
fiduciary duties have a mixed effect. On one hand, they protect directors 
and officers somewhat from suits claiming that they dishonestly or in-
competently failed to achieve shareholder returns. On the other hand, this 
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also exposes directors and officers to new suits claiming that they ig-
nored their social goals. Shareholders, who are the plaintiffs in those 
suits, have their own power shifted accordingly. Neither entrepreneurs 
nor shareholders cede any authority to the challengers in this field, as 
neither employees nor customers gain any control rights under benefit 
corporation statutes. Indeed, although they now have a fiduciary duty 
protecting their interests, employees and customers have no rights under 
the statutes to sue to enforce those rights—only shareholders have stand-
ing to sue (although individual benefit corporations may choose to ex-
tend standing).80 
Moreover, it remains unclear what we expect social enterprises to 
do anyway. How are they supposed to balance seeking profits with seek-
ing good? Much of the time doing good is consistent with long term 
profit, but they may conflict in the short term (sometimes in the long 
term as well). What then? And how much effort is one supposed to put 
into figuring out the potential effect of major decisions on everyone and 
everything that might be affected, as pursuit of “general public benefit” 
seems to require? One could spend massive amounts of time studying the 
effects and then try to weigh and balance them to come to a final deci-
sion. Different persons may well have different ideas about how this 
should be done, with disagreements both between and among officers, 
directors, shareholders, employees, and customers. 
Who wants to wade into that mess once you put it like that? Benefit 
corporations will grow in number and thrive only if there are enough per-
sons in the various constituent groups who really care about pursuing a 
triple bottom line and if ways can be found to reduce the complexities 
and uncertainties surrounding the new status, as well as the legal, eco-
nomic, and social imperatives impinging on such corporations. 
I suspect there are plenty of people with at least some interest in 
participating in social enterprises. If and when such businesses become 
more common, preferences will shift, and more will get involved as the 
option becomes more socially salient and celebrated (again, a sentence 
probably more appealing to a sociologist than an economist, as the latter 
usually treats preferences as fixed and exogenous). 
But what can be done about the uncertainties surrounding benefit 
corporations that are likely deterring many otherwise interested entrepre-
neurs from adopting this new form? To some extent, adoption of new 
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legal forms is a path dependent process—as more adopt the form, uncer-
tainties are gradually reduced, leading to further adoptions, and so on.81 
But what can be done to facilitate the process in its early stages, be-
yond adoption of the new statutes? B Lab, in its role as an IGU, is a part 
of the answer. Its advocacy is helping spread awareness. Its certification 
and publication of analytic metrics is helping to spread fairly detailed 
best practices. B Lab also acts as a focal point to help create a communi-
ty of persons interested in the form. This allows actors to find each other 
to establish new benefit corporations through sharing experiences about 
what works and does not work.82 
The availability of financing is also crucial, and so the development 
of a network of financial professionals with interest in benefit corpora-
tions would be extremely helpful. Most basically, this kind of network 
would make it easier for interested entrepreneurs to find interested inves-
tors. Beyond that, such a network is another way to spread experience 
and best practices. A network of entrepreneurs could perform a similar 
function. This is happening to some extent with the Social Enterprise 
Alliance being a leading force.83 
Transactional lawyers are another possible set of actors who could 
play a major role. Lawyers may help spread awareness of the new legal 
form. More deeply, they may help develop corporate governance struc-
tures and practices that respond to the practical and legal challenges fac-
ing benefit corporations.84 Lawyers advising benefit corporations can 
help craft the statement of a business’s specific goals (if any), create 
structural provisions that address decisionmaking (e.g., the creation of a 
public benefit director specifically focused on the social mission of a 
business), create checklists for items to consider in making major deci-
sions, and create programs for shareholder outreach—which may both 
improve decisionmaking and ward off potential legal conflicts. Other 
possibilities will probably occur to experienced transactional lawyers. 
Down the road, courts may also play a role. If the number of benefit 
corporations grows enough, we will presumably begin to see fiduciary 
duty suits claiming a failure to consider public benefits or securities, or 
consumer fraud suits claiming that benefit reports are misleading. Courts 
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will need to walk a fine line between making liability too likely, so that 
the form becomes unattractive to entrepreneurs, and too unlikely, so that 
the form involves no credible commitment to investors and others.85 Be-
yond this, legal analysis in such suits may help spread, clarify, and hard-
en emerging norms and best practices. Even if courts do not find defend-
ants liable, they may discuss dubious behavior and practices in a way 
that both shames the defendants and helps tell others what they should be 
doing if they want to avoid the risk of landing in court. This is a key way 
in which Delaware fiduciary duty works, even where it imposes little real 
risk of liability.86 Litigation could ultimately perform a similar function 
for benefit corporations.87 
CONCLUSION: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 
Has telling the story of benefit corporations through the lens of stra-
tegic action fields taught me anything about the usefulness of that socio-
logical theory? I will conclude with a few tentative, speculative thoughts 
on that question. Let us start with a few points where I find the theory 
clearly helpful, and in some ways superior, to my home turf: law and 
economics. 
First, the concept of the existential function of the social88 is quite 
natural and helpful in thinking about what motivates various actors to 
become involved in benefit corporations. Although economic theory al-
lows for nonselfish motivations, selfishness sits deep within the DNA of 
economics. Even where economics allows for other sorts of motivations, 
it says little about them. My subtitle speaks of the existential failure of 
Delaware, but it could instead refer to the existential failure of law and 
economics. Businesses are a central part of the life of their officers and 
employees, and sometimes of their shareholders. Those persons need 
financial returns from their livelihood, but as human beings, they look to 
other forms of meaning and purpose as well in such a central part of their 
lives. Thus, the potential allure of social enterprise becomes much more 
clear and powerful in that light. 
Which is not to say that the theory and analysis are all starry-eyed 
about the idealism underlying social enterprise; more selfish motivations 
play a major role as well. These include not only the pursuit of financial 
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gain, but also the ability to control decisionmaking and influence the 
corporation.89 The theory’s mix of selfishness and meaning in under-
standing human motivations strikes me as quite attractive and plausi-
ble—a clear improvement over an economic framework. 
Second, the emphasis on internal governance units and the role of 
the state is also helpful. B Lab clearly serves many of the functions of an 
IGU in strategic action field theory.90 I am somewhat less convinced that 
the theory adds a lot to economic reasoning here, though. Economics has 
plenty to tell us about the role of certification as a way of overcoming 
asymmetric information, and about the importance of lobbying associa-
tions as a way of overcoming collective action problems in politics. I 
want to see more about what the theory can add here. 
The theory’s focus on the role of the state in enabling and legitimat-
ing new fields91 clearly fits with the story of benefit corporations. Here 
too, I remain open-minded but not yet completely convinced about what 
the theory adds to already common public choice and political theories. 
Perhaps, though, the role of ideology in making benefit corporations at-
tractive to politicians from both parties is an insight that would not fit as 
well in the theory of law and economics.92 
One element of the theory to which I am rather more resistant is the 
strong emphasis on power struggles between incumbents and challeng-
ers, reflecting perhaps its partial origins in social movement theory. This 
may be a useful corrective to the blindness of economics to power in 
many ways, and within benefit corporations there is a real power dynam-
ic. Employees have little power in ordinary business corporations, which 
carries over to the new form. This is perhaps most strikingly expressed in 
the unwillingness to extend standing to sue.93 But in forming new social 
enterprises, the focus is on the relationship between an entrepreneur—or 
small group of entrepreneurs—and potential investors. While that rela-
tionship is not devoid of power elements, to say the least, it is also an 
attempt to find a cooperative arrangement for both entrepreneurs and 
investors to benefit from the business while simultaneously getting the 
participation they need from the other party. 
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Which leads me to a main area where I would grade this exercise as 
incomplete. The final portion of Part IV considered various ways in 
which different actors may try to build institutions and practices that help 
benefit corporations thrive.94 How much does and could strategic action 
field theory help us understand these processes? On the one hand, the 
focus on the creation of shared understandings and norms within a field 
is quite useful—at a high level of abstraction, which is what I am at-
tempting to describe and analyze there. But the devil is in the details. 
How do actors within an emerging field help create and spread new prac-
tices that will support this new institution? How do they persuade others 
that this is a good thing, and worth becoming a part of? Of particular in-
terest to me, as a law professor, is what role do transactional lawyers 
play in this process? What concrete, detailed conceptual tools does the 
theory have to offer in trying to understand this? Having read just a book 
and an article, I do not yet feel capable of answering that question. 
This leads to the question of methodology. Fligstein and McAdam 
maintain a neutral and inclusive approach to various forms of empirical 
methodologies. They think that existing types of quantitative and qualita-
tive methods can be usefully deployed within their framework.95 On the 
one hand, this is a breath of fresh air to someone immersed in law and 
economics, where a highly quantitative focus on regressions has come to 
dominate the field. I suspect that for the kinds of questions I have dis-
cussed in this Article, qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviews 
with actors in the field, would be at least as useful (really, much more 
useful) than trying to find variables to measure so that one could run a 
regression.96 
On the other hand, at least as far as the book goes, Fligstein and 
McAdams’s very agnosticism yields little guidance as to how to do good 
empirical work within this theoretical approach. It is not much more than 
a suggestion to go forth and commit anthropology (though that is a useful 
suggestion). Again, further reading of more applied field theory may 
provide more guidance, but this is where I stand at the moment. 
My third and final point concerns the normative implications of 
field theory. I have not dealt much with the normative question of 
whether we should be encouraging the development of benefit corpora-
tions and social enterprises. One can probably detect an approving tone 
in this Article. I would say that I am currently intrigued, but have a lot of 
questions about the attractiveness and viability of the form. Within law 
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and economics scholarship, there is a large amount of literature on the 
desirability of focusing director and officer duty solely on maximizing 
shareholder wealth. I have not confronted that literature here.97 In part, 
that’s because this is a short article, and my main goal is to understand 
the early stages of the emergence of benefit corporations. The normative 
case for and against the form is a huge topic in its own right. 
Another reason why I have done little to engage the normative lit-
erature is because I am not at all sure what field theory has to say on the 
point. The emphasis on incumbents and challengers seems to carry a 
vague whiff of support for social change and disempowered groups, but I 
see little in the Fligstein and McAdam book that makes such a position 
explicit, or develops conceptual tools to help analyze what fields may be 
more or less socially attractive, and how we should be modifying fields 
to improve them. Perhaps that is because the authors do not see taking 
normative positions as a central part of their task. That is perfectly fine, 
and it aligns with the self-understanding of social scientists as scientists. 
But if so, I think that when it comes to legal scholarship, the lack of 
normative tools may put field theory at a distinct disadvantage in the 
competition for influence with law and economics. Though economists 
also stress their standing as scientists (sometimes obsessively so, and to 
my mind quite unconvincingly), economic theory has a strong explicit 
and implicit normative component. That component has, I believe, 
played a major role in its spread throughout legal academe. 
Law is an inherently normative discipline. Law is a series of delib-
erate policy choices that plays a big role in shaping our society (as in-
deed Fligstein and McAdam emphasize). Lawyers play a major role in 
that process, and law professors try both to shape their students and to 
directly persuade policymakers. It is not clear how often we succeed, but 
we try. Any regular participant in law school workshops has heard this 
question more times than they could possibly count: “What are the prac-
tical implications for legal change?” Does strategic action field theory 
have new or plausible things to say about what the law should do in 
shaping fields? That, too, is a very major topic about which I am inter-
ested in learning more. 
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